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MAJOR PROVISIONS OF LABOUR CONTRACTS 





Theoretical work on indexation and contract duration suggests no role for the expected rate of 
inflation in equations explaining these variables. Yet, stand-alone or two-equation studies of 
indexation and contract duration often report that this variable is statistically significant. We 
study a wider econometric system which includes, in addition, non-contingent wage 
adjustment. This third, jointly dependent, variable and its nominal anchor (the expected rate 
of inflation) play a role in the duration and indexation decisions and offer a context within 
which earlier findings can be understood. In this three-equation system, the wage equation 
accommodates complex mechanisms through which price inflation feeds into wage 
adjustment both within and across contracts. The elasticity of indexation is modelled as a 
latent variable, supporting consideration of both the incidence and the intensity of indexation 
and linking consistently with the wage equation. In our results, the expected rate of inflation 
has no role in the duration equation and only a minor one in the elasticity of indexation 
equation. These findings are more consistent with received theory but they also suggest that 
more complex models involving all three variables and the sequence of contracts signed by a 
bargaining pair are needed. 
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Provisions of labour contracts such as their duration and the contingent and
non-contingent wage adjustments that they entail are important economic
outcomes in themselves and have signiﬁcant macroeconomic implications.
Long term contracts freeze the terms on which agents interact and make
it possible for the authorities to aﬀect macroeconomic performance through
unanticipated actions. Complete compensation against inﬂation perpetuates
the real wage rate structure and may lead to ineﬃciencies and costly quan-
tity adjustments. Compensation against inﬂation can be achieved through
indexation but, the data suggest, it is more likely to happen through non-
contingent wage increases. Non-contingent increases reﬂect current expecta-
tions of future inﬂation but they also embody uncompensated inﬂation from
the earlier contract, thus providing a propagation mechanism that stretches
out the economy’s response to shocks. The length of this propagation mech-
anism may itself be increased by inﬂation uncertainty. While much can be
gleaned from the very complete data that describe formal and legally binding
union contracts, the provisions of these agreements may also shed light on
behaviour in the rest of the economy.
Our current understanding of what shapes the provisions of union con-
tracts dates back to theoretical and empirical work carried out during the
high-inﬂation period of the 1970s and the 1980s.1 This literature suggests
1For theoretical contributions see Blinder (1977), Azariadis (1978), Card (1983, 1986),
Dye (1985), Danziger (1988), Ehrenberg, Danziger and San (1983, 1984), Gray (1976,
1978), and Shavell (1976). Concern with contingent wage adjustment produced empirical
studies that deal with the measurement, intensity but, typically, incidence of indexa-
tion clauses (Wilton (1980), Estenson (1981), Card (1983, 1986), Cousineau, Lacroix and
Bilodeau (1983), and Ehrenberg, Danziger and San (1983, 1984)). Another literature
considers how to integrate Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) clauses into wage-change
1that contractual provisions such as duration and indexation are intercon-
nected, that non-contingent wage adjustment is an important dimension of
labour contracts and that the inﬂation environment (expected inﬂation and
inﬂation uncertainty), the state of the product and labour markets (real un-
certainty, productivity shocks and unemployment), contractual costs, and
bargaining pair-speciﬁc variables (attitudes to risk and how ﬁrm and other
i n c o m e sm o v ew i t hi n ﬂation) all inﬂuence these provisions.
Two important, outstanding, issues concern (i) the theoretically surpris-
ing role2 found in many empirical studies3 for the expected rate of inﬂation
equations (Mitchell (1980), Kaufman and Woglom (1984), Vroman (1984), Hendricks and
Kahn (1983, 1985, 1986), Christoﬁdes (1987), and Prescott and Wilton (1992)). The
literature dealing with contract duration includes (Christoﬁdes and Wilton (1983), Vro-
man (1989), Wallace and Blanco (1991), Murphy (1992, 2000), Davis and Kanago (1997),
Kanago (1998), Barcena-Ruiz and Campo (2000), Wallace (2001), and Rich and Tracy
(2004)). Attempts to explore the simultaneities involved have been partial, studying con-
tract duration, indexation, and wage adjustment in various pairs (Prescott and Wilton
(1992), Bils (1990), and Christoﬁdes and Peng (forthcoming)) and typically looking at the
incidence, rather than the intensity, of indexation. Two studies that have addressed all
three issues are Christoﬁdes (1990) and Murphy (2000). Based on a smaller sample, the
former concludes in favour of a causal structure, where contract duration and indexation
are determined ﬁrst, feeding into non-contingent wage adjustment at a later stage. Mur-
phy (2000) studies a simultaneous context where the study of indexation is conﬁned to
incidence and the wage equation is linear.
2Ehrenberg, Danziger and San (1984, Table 1, row 7) and Gray (1978, note 3, 3) note
that the expected rate of inﬂation plays no role in the canonical models.
3Cousineau, Lacroix and Bilodeau (1983), examining contract duration and COLA
incidence, report a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient for expected inﬂa t i o ni nt h ed u r a t i o n
equation and a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient in the COLA incidence equation. Using
various proxies, Rich and Tracy (2004, Table 5) report signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for most of
their expected inﬂation proxies which are negative in the duration equation and positive
in the COLA incidence equation. The same pattern is also found in Christoﬁdes and Peng
2in contract duration and indexation equations and (ii) the related, we ar-
gue, fact that all studies stop short of a fully simultaneous treatment of
contract duration, the elasticity of indexation, and non-contingent wage ad-
justment. Since duration and indexation are negotiated at the same time
as non-contingent wage adjustment, it is possible that the role assumed by
expected inﬂation in empirical studies reﬂects the fact that non-contingent
wage adjustment has not typically been taken into account.4 To fully explore
a possible role for the expected rate of inﬂation in shaping the duration and
indexation decisions it is necessary to spell out and simultaneously estimate
the missing wage equation.
With these challenges in mind, we examine a long (1976-2000) history of
Canadian collective bargaining agreements in an econometric context where
(i) full simultaneity involving duration, indexation and non-contingent wage
adjustment is possible, (ii) indexation is modeled as a censored variable (al-
lowing examination of both the incidence and the intensity of indexation),
(iii) the wage equation nests Phillips and Wage Curve behaviour, is consis-
tent with the possibility that current and/or past contracts may be indexed,
and accounts for the history of expected future and uncompensated past in-
ﬂation, and (iv) contingent, non-contingent, and total wage adjustment are
modelled endogenously, in the context of a uniﬁed framework.
The database used derives largely from electronic records maintained by
the ministry (Human Resources Development Canada or HRDC) responsi-
(forthcoming). A number of other authors also control for the expected inﬂation rate in
duration and indexation equations.
4For instance, contingent and non-contingent wage adjustments are natural substitutes
and the expected real non-contingent wage adjustment should enter a structural indexation
equation with a negative sign - implying, as in footnote 3, a positive sign for expected
inﬂation.
3ble for these legally binding agreements, thereby ensuring continuity and
accuracy. Continuity is essential to devising an appropriate framework for
modelling how price inﬂation feeds into wage inﬂation. In a world where the
distribution of anticipated inﬂation is not degenerate at the expected rate,
uncertainty about future inﬂation can be dealt with ex post by taking un-
compensated inﬂation into account in a subsequent contract. This notion dif-
ferentiates intra-contract non-contingent compensation and contingent com-
pensation through a COLA clause from inter-contract non-contingent wage
adjustment for uncompensated past inﬂation. However, uncertainty about
future inﬂation also aﬀects contract duration and indexation. Theory sug-
gests that greater inﬂation uncertainty should shrink the length of contracts
and intensify indexation. It may also stretch out compensation against inﬂa-
tion by strengthening the ex post mechanism described above, a possibility
that we examine.
Future inﬂation is modelled using recursive GARCH procedures, ensuring
that both expected inﬂation and inﬂation uncertainty are generated in an
internally consistent manner. The same procedures can be used to generate
real uncertainty, a variable whose inﬂuence on contract duration has been
stressed by Danziger (1988).
The model is used to analyse total (including COLA-generated) wage
change as well as contract duration and indexation. An assumed disinﬂa-
tion, of the type experienced during the recessions of the early 1990s, pro-
duces changes in contractual provisions which are very similar to the actual
ones. However, the transmission mechanism is through the impact of ex-
pected inﬂation on non-contingent wage adjustment and thence to contract
duration and indexation. A general-to-particular modeling strategy suggests
that expected inﬂation per se is no longer needed in the contract duration
4equation, while its inﬂuence in the indexation equation is muted.
While our results are more consistent with received theory, they also serve
an inductive role in that they call for more complete theoretical models of how
major provisions of labour contracts are shaped. Since the evidence, here and
elsewhere, that uncompensated inﬂation from the previous contract aﬀects
non-contingent wage adjustment is very strong, theoretical eﬀorts should take
into account the long-term relationships that exist in the labour market.5
Section 2 deals with speciﬁcation and econometric issues. Section 3 dis-
cusses the contract data as well as information that has been appended from
other sources. Section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5 provides
a summary of our ﬁndings.
2E c o n o m e t r i c S p e c i ﬁcation
2.1 Uncertain Inﬂation, Intra and Inter-Contract Com-
pensation
In general, actual inﬂation will diﬀer from what is anticipated. In a context
where consecutive bargaining between pairs occurs, it is natural for uncom-
pensated inﬂation to appear as an issue in subsequent negotiations, leading
to inter-contract compensation against inﬂation. Since this uncompensated
inﬂation mechanism serves a purpose similar to that of a COLA clause, it is
necessary to take both into account when specifying a general wage adjust-
5In the sample we examine, a large number of continuous contract histories exist and
the maximum number of consecutive contracts signed by the same bargaining pair is 18.
5ment equation.6 Consider the equation
WNCt = c + α(1 − εt)πt + β[(Pt−1 − απt−1)Lt−1/Lt] −
δ[εt−1(Pt−1 − απt−1)Lt−1/Lt]+··· (1)
where the subscript t indicates the current and t−1 the previous contract.
WNCt is the non-contingent wage adjustment over the current contract at
annual rates, εt is the elasticity of indexation7, Pt and πt are actual and
expected inﬂation respectively at annual rates, L indicates the length of a
contract, and c,α,β and δ are constant parameters. Discussion of other rel-
evant variables is postponed. On the right hand side (RHS) of equation (1),
non-contingent wage adjustment is composed of three parts: (i) A portion
(1 − εt)πt of expected inﬂation πt is not captured by the elasticity of index-
ation in the current COLA clause, unless indexation is complete (εt =1 )i n
which case this term drops out. The amount α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) times (1 − εt)πt
is built into non-contingent wage adjustment. If no COLA clause exists in
the current contract (εt =0 ) , this term becomes the standard expectational
one απt. This term captures intra-contract non-contingent wage adjustment.
(ii) The expression (Pt−1 − απt−1) represents uncompensated inﬂation from
the previous contract, or inter-contract non-contingent wage adjustment. In
6Other authors have included various functions of the actual and expected inﬂation rate
in wage equations - see Turnovsky (1972), Auld et al (1979), Riddell (1979), Kaufman and
Woglom (1984), Vroman (1984), Hendicks and Kahn (1985, 1986), and Christoﬁdes (1987).
The uncompensated inﬂation mechanism allows the bargaining pair to avoid potentially
costly arguments and implementation mistakes over inﬂation pass-through, given that past
wrongs can be put right at future negotiations. This mechanism may be particularly useful
at times of more uncertain inﬂation. We return to this point below.
7This is deﬁned as the percentage change in the nominal wage rate divided by the
percentage change in the consumer price index, both appropriately annualised - see the
data section.
6the event that the duration of the contract changes, the term Lt−1/Lt ap-
propriately annualizes this uncompensated inﬂation, otherwise it drops out.
The amount β (0 ≤ β ≤ 1) times the ﬁrst term in square brackets may be
built into the current contract as ‘catch-up’ for uncompensated past-contract
inﬂation. If α =1 , as is assumed in the standard version of the expectations-
augmented Phillips Curve, then uncompensated inﬂation over the previous
contract (Pt−1−απt−1) is equal to unexpected inﬂation (Pt−1−πt−1). (iii) In
the event that the previous contract included a COLA clause (εt−1 > 0),a
portion εt−1 times uncompensated inﬂation would have been captured by the
indexation provisions in the previous contract. Thus, term (ii) above over-
compensates and an amount δ (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1) times the second square bracket
must be subtracted. If εt−1 =0 , this term drops out. Equation (1) can be
further simpliﬁed to
WNCt = c + α(1 − εt)πt + β{(1 − εt−1)[(Pt−1 − απt−1)Lt−1/Lt]}... (2)
if β = δ. Prior testing suggested that this constraint can be accepted and
further estimation is based on equation (2). If εt = εt−1 =1 , all response
to inﬂation occurs through the indexation clause and WNCt equals c. If
εt = εt−1 =0 , equation (2) collapses to c plus intra (απt)a n di n t e r( β(Pt−1−
απt−1)Lt−1/Lt)c o n t r a c tn o n - c o n t i n g e n ta d j u s t m e n t .
Equation (2) can deal with any pattern of indexation provisions in the
current and past contracts and there is no need to analyze indexed and non-
indexed contracts separately, as was done in some earlier studies. In partic-
ular, there is no need to single out for special treatment wage agreements
whose indexation status or contract duration changes between contracts.
72.2 Contract Duration and Indexation
Equation (2) can be estimated using non-linear ordinary least squares, pro-
vided εt and Lt are exogenous. However, since contract duration, indexation
and non-contingent wage adjustment are all determined during the negoti-
ation process, exogeneity cannot be assumed and a simultaneous structure
must be allowed for.
Here, duration is measured as the continuous variable Lt and indexation
arrangements are captured by the elasticity of indexation εt.T h u sat h r e e -
variable system is considered consisting of equation (2) and:
Lt = γ1·ε
∗
t + ζ1WNCt + X
0
1tθ1 + u1 (3)
ε
∗
t = γ2·Lt + ζ2WNCt + X
0
2tθ2 + u2 (4)










Since one of the endogenous variables, ε∗
t, is a latent variable and equation
(2) is non-linear, the system cannot be readily estimated in a single step.
However, the Tobit model in equations (4) and (5) can be linearized and the
Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method can be applied to the
three-equation system. The linearized form of equations (4) and (5) is given
(Maddala 1983, 222) by
εt = γ2ΦtLt + ζ2ΦtWNCt + ΦtX
0
2tθ2 + σ2φt + u3, (6)
where φt and Φt are the standard normal density and distribution func-
tions, respectively, and these expressions are evaluated at the values of the
8variables for the individual observations t. Equations (2), (3), and (6) could
be estimated by Maximum Likelihood if φt and Φt were known. Estimates of
b φt and c Φt can be obtained from a Probit equation, and φt, Φt can be replaced
with b φt, c Φt as explanatory variables in a modiﬁed version of equation (6)
εt = γ2(c ΦtLt)+ζ2(c ΦtWNCt)+( c ΦtX
0
2t)θ2 + σ2b φt + u4. (7)
The variables in the Probit equation are as in equation (4), the coeﬃcients
being normalized by the standard deviation of u2, which cannot be separately
identiﬁed. The system consisting of equations (2), (3) and (7) can be esti-
mated by FIML, iterating until parameter estimates, including parameter
estimates in the initial Probit equation, converge. The latent nature of the
elasticity variable, simultaneity, as well as the non-linear wage structure are
all taken into account. While the X1 and X2 variables are discussed below,
it is important to note that both equations condition on the expected rate of
inﬂation and the nominal anchor that it provides. Without this anchor, the
level of inﬂation and hence WNC w o u l dh a v ei m p l i c a t i o n sf o rt h ee l a s t i c i t y
of indexation and contract duration. More discussion of this issue appears
in section 3.2.
2.3 Further Aspects of Wage Adjustment
Extant macroeconometric and microeconometric evidence shows a negative
relationship between nominal wage adjustment and the unemployment rate,
the Phillips Curve. However, many theoretical models and some empirical
evidence support a Wage Curve, describing a negative relationship between
t h el e v e lo ft h er e a lw a g ea n dt h er a t eo fu n e m p l o y m e n t . 8 A nesting equation
8See Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1994, 2005).
9includes the real wage from the previous contract and current productivity
on the RHS of equation (2).9
Another aspect of our wage adjustment model is the distinction between
the non-contingent wage change described in equation (2), the contingent
wage change WCt = εtPt which is determined endogenously given εt in equa-
tion (7), and the total wage change WT t which is the sum of the two. The
model is capable of addressing all three concepts.
The discussion so far has focussed on the speciﬁcation of the main vari-
ables and their interdependence, abstracting from other important forces
that operate on wage adjustment, contract duration and the elasticity of
indexation. These are discussed below.
3 Data and Sources
3.1 The HRDC Data Base
The contract data used for this study is constructed from electronic records
provided by HRDC. The database contains information on 11885 contracts
agreed upon between 1976 and 2000. In order to take into account lagged
eﬀects, only observations where at least one prior agreement has been negoti-
ated are considered, leaving 9646 observations covering the period 1977-2000.
For these, any variable available for the current contract is also available for
the previous contract and is denoted by a p preﬁx.
The HRDC data contains information on a number of variables, including
9This is spelled out in Blanchard and Katz (1999) in a time series context. Their
equation (6) can be re-written in the form just suggested by dropping the implied coeﬃcient
constraints. A Phillips Curve would not involve the lagged real wage in the nominal wage
adjustment equation while a Wage Curve would. See also Farès (2002).
10the three main variables under study. Descriptive statistics are presented in
Table 1. On average, total wage adjustment is about 4.8% with a standard
deviation of 4.2 percentage points. Non-contingent wage adjustment counts
for over 90% of total wage change with a mean of 4.45% and a standard
deviation of 4.06 percentage points. Duration is deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between the eﬀective and expiry dates of the contract10, and is shown to have
a mean of 25.63 months with a standard deviation of 11.5 months. The COLA
provisions in contracts are diverse and complex but they generally describe
how the base wage rate changes as some price index evolves. The variable
Elasticity, εt, is deﬁn e da st h ep e r c e n t a g ec h a n g ei nt h eb a s ew a g er a t ed u e
to the COLA clause divided by the percentage change in the CPI, both over
the life of the contract.11 When the agreement does not contain a COLA
10An important literature deals with ‘holdout’, i.e. the gap that exists between the
previous contract’s expiry date and the current contract’s settlement date. Crampton
and Tracy (1992, 1994) and Gu and Kuhn (1998) consider the information-gathering sig-
niﬁcance (this relates to the ability of the ﬁrm to pay and to details of the settlements
reached by other bargaining pairs) of this period for the bargaining process. Danziger and
Newman (2005) examine optimal holdout in the context of a macroeconomic perspective.
The deﬁnition of contract duration used here is the same as that of the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. The negotiating process for all but 756 of the 9646 contracts in our sample
began before the expiry date. Where holdout exists (8078 contracts), the eﬀective date
speciﬁed in the new contract was equal to the previous expiry date in 6962 out of the 8078
contracts, thereby maintaining an uninterrupted sequence of agreements. As Rich and
Tracy (2004) note, timing issues may arise if additional information (e.g. the expected
inﬂation rate) that we assign according to the eﬀective date does not conform with what
agents had in mind at the time of settlement. Agents may have considered values at the
start of negotiations, values on settlement, or something in-between such as the eﬀective
date used here. We do not have information that would reliably discriminate among these
possibilities. This issue is less likely to be important in the context of the quarterly data
used here.
11An ex ante elasticity of indexation is not available in this data. Note that the term
11clause, εt =0 . As Table 1 shows, the unconditional mean value of Elasticity
is 0.075 with a standard deviation of 0.257. Conditional on Elasticity>0,
this value for the 1256 contracts involved is 0.579 with a standard deviation
of 0.462. A related variable Cola equals unity when the contract contains
a formal COLA clause, even when it was not activated,12 and is equal to
zero otherwise. Its mean value is 0.192, indicating that less than 20% of the
contracts contain a COLA clause.
Figure 1 shows average values of Duration, Elasticity and WNCt over the
contracts that became eﬀective in each of the years in the sample. WNC t
was as high as 13% in 1981, and it decreased to less than 3% in the 1990s.
Duration, on the right scale of Figure 1, more than doubled from 18 months
in 1978 to 38 months in 1998. Elasticity was quite volatile; it increased
dramatically during 1990-1991, decreased continually till 1998 and increased
substantially in 1999. The substantial variance in these variables makes their
study of interest but it also ensures that, where they appear as explanatory
variables, they have suﬃcient variation to make them statistically useful.
3.2 Other variables in the Three Equations
A number of variables were attached to the HRDC database and appear
in some, or all three, equations. Exclusion restrictions are suggested by
the underlying theory, they have been checked statistically, and they are
discussed below. An important variable is the regional unemployment rate,
contingent wage change refers to COLA-induced wage adjustments because the only con-
tingency built into contracts is with respect to inﬂation.
12There are 1854 contracts for which Cola=1 and, for these contracts, the mean value of
Elasticity is 0.393 with a standard deviation of 0.467. The mean for this group is lower than
that in the 1256 contracts since the latter includes only contracts for which the indexation
trigger was exceeded and the COLA clause generated a positive wage adjustment.
12Rurate, prevailing at the time the contract became eﬀective. This rate varies
cross-sectionally and over time. For instance, in 1988, the unemployment
rate was 5.0% in Ontario and 12.4% in the Atlantic region; the variation
over time is exempliﬁed by the increase in Ontario’s unemployment rate
to 10.9% in 1992. Figure 2 shows WTt, Rurate, and actual and expected
inﬂation, averaged over the contracts of each year, in the period 1977-2000.
The unemployment rate ﬂuctuates around a mean of 9.36 over the whole
period, with cyclical changes which are contrary to the changes in price
inﬂation and wage adjustment. This variable appears in all three equations
as it signals bargaining strength and is central to both Phillips and Wage
Curve ideas. The price inﬂation variables are discussed below.
A variable in the HRDC data base is the nominal base wage rate proﬁle in
eﬀect over the contract. Given this and price information that was appended,
it is possible to construct the average nominal and real wage rates prevailing
over a contract. In this paper, the previous real wage, which is exogenous to
the current contract, is used in the nesting wage equation referred to earlier
- in the sensitivity analysis below, we test whether the real wage rate should
also enter the duration and indexation equations. As Table 1 shows, the
Pnomwage is, on average, $13.308 with a standard deviation of $5.469 over
the 9646 contracts. The previous real wage, Prealwage, has a higher mean as
it is deﬂated by a CPI which has a base of 100 rather late in the sample (in
1992). Another variable in the nesting wage equation that has an important
role in the wage determination process is a measure of productivity shocks.
The variable Prodshock, deﬁned as the the deviation of the natural loga-
rithm of real GDP from its trend, is also attached to the database using the
previous contract value to avoid possible endogeneity. General productivity
shocks have not been an explicit concern of the literature on indexation and
13contract duration; we exclude Prodshock from these equations but test for
this exclusion in our sensitivity analysis.
In addition, a number of other variables, particularly changes in public
policies, have been suggested as determinants of nominal wage change. Until
the second quarter of 1978, the Anti Inﬂation Board (AIB) controlled wages
in the both the private and public sectors. Auld et al (1979) found that,
ceteris paribus, this program reduced wage inﬂation. Beginning in 1982, a
number of provinces attempted in a variety of ways to control wage growth
in their own public sector. During the 1990s, more determined eﬀorts were
made to do likewise in both the provincial and federal public sectors. Three
dummy variables, 7control, 8provcontr and 9pubcontr are used to ﬂag these
programs respectively.13
The duration and indexation equations also include the logarithm of the
number of employees in the previous contract (Plemployee): large and prob-
ably more sophisticated bargaining units are more likely to seek long and
indexed contracts and ﬁrms may be more willing to spread out the cost
of indexation over a larger number of employees and a longer time period.
There is no direct theoretical inﬂuence on wage behaviour, other than possi-
ble bargaining power eﬀects, but we test for this exclusion in our sensitivity
analysis.
All three equations include region (Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario which is
13The detailed information on the 1990s programs, required to set up 9pubcontr, was
obtained from Swimmer (2000). We attempt to capture the inﬂuence of provincial controls
programs by setting 8provcontr=1 for provincial settlements that became eﬀective in 1982.
The AIB remained in eﬀect until the second quarter of 1978 (inclusive) and all settlements
up to the end of that quarter would have been subject to its scrutiny. In our sensitivity
analysis, we test whether the controls programs are important in the contract duration
and indexation equations.
14the omitted category, Prairie, British Columbia and Territories) and indus-
try (Construction, Transportation, Communications, Utilities, Trade, Edu-
cation, Health, Services, Other and Manufacturing as the omitted category)
eﬀects - see Table 1. These variables control for demand and supply elastic-
ities which ﬁgure prominently in theoretical discussions. They also account
for unobservables that may inﬂuence bargaining outcomes, thereby allowing
the variables that we are particularly interested in to have a clearer statistical
role. Information on industry and region is available in the HRDC records.
Each of the duration and indexation equations, includes as regressors
the remaining two jointly determined variables (e.g. WNCt and εt in the
case of duration) and conditions on the expected rate of inﬂation. Doing so
provides a nominal anchor in all equations of the system and allows us to
consider whether duration and indexation are sensitive to the nominal or the
expected real values of non-contingent wage change. Following the general-
to-particular route, we can check what role, if any, must be accorded to the
expected rate of inﬂation per se, as distinct from the expected real values
that it deﬁnes.
The equations also include the previous-contract own value of duration or
the elasticity of indexation. These values capture slow adjustment and pair-
speciﬁc factors that may inﬂuence the two decisions but on which no infor-
mation is available. The duration and indexation equations include nominal
and real uncertainty, variables stressed by the theoretical discussions men-
tioned above and the construction of which merits special attention; we test
for the exclusion of these variables from the wage equation.
153.3 Future Inﬂation, Nominal and Real Uncertainty
Many previous researchers used survey data or sliding-regression techniques
to generate proxies for expected inﬂation and inﬂation uncertainty. Survey
measures are widely used in US studies, e.g. Vroman (1989), Kanago (1998),
and Rich and Tracy (2004). However, good quality survey data are not
available in Canada14 and sliding regression techniques have been superceded
by modern time series methods. A recursive AR(6) regression model15 with a
GARCH(1,1) error process provided the best ﬁt. xt = γ0+γ1xt−1+γ2xt−2+
γ3xt−3 + γ4xt−4 + γ5xt−5 + γ6xt−6 + εt, where εt|Ψt−1 ∼ N (0,h t) and ht =
ω+αε2
t−1+βht−1, was used to describe x={the inﬂation rate, rate of growth of
real GDP}, where the inﬂation rate is given by 100ln(CPIt/CPIt−4)16 and
t h er a t eo fg r o w t ho fr e a lG D P 17 is deﬁned analogously. As a by-product
of GARCH estimation, a proxy of expected inﬂation is constructed from
the forecast values of xt one quarter ahead. Expected inﬂation, Expinf, is
assigned to each contract according to its eﬀective date. The implied error
14GARCH-based proxies were preferable to Conference Board in Canada survey data
on conceptual and statistical grounds.
15That is, new quarterly observations are added to the sample one at a time as history
unfolds and the model is re-estimated. This assumes that agents have the latest (but no
future) information set at hand and that they use it to estimate the most recent GARCH
structure for their predictions.
16Quarterly data availalble over 1946Q1-2000Q3 (1992=100) were used for the inﬂation
process. CPI is CANSIM I Series P10000 and CANSIM II Series v735739. In a benchmark
study, Crawford and Kasumovish (1996) review diﬀerent ARCH/GARCH models for the
Canadian CPI inﬂation series; their results show that a relatively simple ﬁxed parameter
GARCH model, such as the one used here, can capture the characteristics of Canadian
inﬂation well.
17Real GDP is Cansim series D15721. A linear ﬁlter is used on the natural logrithm of
real GDP to construct the Productivity variable (the deviation of ln real GDP from trend)
included in the wage equation.
16variance ht is time dependent and proxies nominal (Nomuncert) and real
(Realuncert) uncertainty when based on the inﬂation and real GDP growth
equations respectively. Note that the variables Pt and Pt−1 in equation (2)
are derived from the same CPI series using the dates of the relevant contract
and are expressed at annual rates. In Figure 2, actual inﬂation Pt, expected
inﬂation πt, and total wage adjustment WT t show exactly the same trend:
All series decline from over 10% in the late 1970s and early 1980s to about
3% after 1990 and move against the regional unemployment rate.
In Figure 3, the variable Nomuncert has a general tendency to decline but
one that is interrupted by the major recessions of the early 1980s and 1990s.
During these periods but especially during the early 1990s, the dramatic
stepdown of inﬂation generated substantial increases in nominal uncertainty.
These breaks in the secular decline of nominal uncertainty may not be gen-
erally appreciated and have important implications for this study which are
examined below. It should be noted that Expinf and Nomuncert are neg-
atively correlated18, suggesting that the former does not proxy the latter.
In the case of Realuncert, this variable is stationary with substantial spikes
during the early 1980s and 1990s, as well as smaller spikes in 1985 and 1987.
18A simple regression produces Nomuncert=0.428(159.6)-0.018(-35.5)Expinf with an R
Squared of 0.12. Note that the terms nominal and inﬂation uncertainty are used inter-
changeably.
174 Empirical Results
4.1 General Findings From Single Equations
We begin by reporting single equation results. Since these are similar to but
dominated by the FIML results19,w ec o n ﬁne them to the Appendix Tables
A1 and A2 and discuss them only in this paragraph. In Table A1, estimates
of equation (2) are based on non-linear least squares, those of the elasticity
equations (4) and (5) on Tobit, and those of the duration equation (3) on
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Appendix Table A2, presents the coeﬃcients
for the Tobit estimates in column 1, the marginal eﬀects (F(¯ z)·coefficient)
in column 2, and the McDonald and Moﬃtt (1980) decomposition of the mar-
ginal eﬀects. The latter are broken down into the impact of a change in the
variable xi on (i) the Elasticity above zero, ∂Elasticity∗/∂xi, weighted by the
probability, F(¯ z), of being above zero (this is denoted as the Intensity Eﬀect
in column 3), and on (ii) the probability of being above the limit, ∂F(¯ z)/∂xi
weighted by the expected value of the latent elasticity E(Elasticity∗) (this
is denoted as the Incidence Eﬀect in column 4). The variable ¯ z is the stan-
dardized mean value of the argument. The ﬁgures in columns 3 and 4,
Table A2, add up to the complete marginal eﬀect in column 2, Table A2.
Columns 5 and 6, Table A2, give ∂Elasticity∗/∂xi (the Elasticity* Eﬀect)
and ∂F(¯ z)/∂xi (the Probability Eﬀect) respectively.20 Table A2 shows that,
relative to the coeﬃcients, the marginal eﬀects are muted. Also, while the
Elasticity and Probability Eﬀects are relatively close in size, their weights in
19In the case of the Tobit results, it is the marginal eﬀects, in Appendix Table A2,
column 2, that should be compared to those in Table 2 below, given that equation (7)
contains variables that have been multiplied by the distribution function Φt.
20Note that F(¯ z)=0 .0915,f (¯ z)=0 .1644,E (Elasticity)=0 .0294 and
E(Elasticity∗)=0 .321.
18the McDonald and Moﬃtt (1980) decomposition are not. Since the probabil-
ity of indexation is considerably lower than the conditional expectation, i.e.
F(¯ z) <E (Elasticity∗), the impact of changes in variables on the weighted
probability of indexation (column 4, Table A2) is larger than their weighted
impact on the degree of indexation (column 3, Table A2). For instance,
Pelasticity, the variable with the largest marginal eﬀect of 0.0933, has an
Incidence Eﬀect of 0.0779 and an Intensity Eﬀect of 0.0153 - allowing for
rounding. Leaving the diﬃculty of generating an elasticity variable aside,
these results suggest that it is easier to model the incidence than the inten-
sity of indexation.
Before proceeding to consider the FIML results, it is important to con-
ﬁrm that a fully simultaneous treatment of the three equations is appropriate.
Various exclusion restrictions have been noted in the discussion above and
are addressed further below. Based on theoretical considerations and ear-
lier studies, εt and Lt are integral to equation (2). Attention is focused on
equations (3) and (7). Whether WNC t also belongs to these equations is
considered by conducting modiﬁed Hausman tests (1978).21 These suggest
that full simultaneity cannot be rejected at the 1% level.
4.2 The Simultaneous System
Table 2 presents results on contract duration (columns 1 and 2), the elas-
ticity of indexation (columns 3 and 4) and non-contingent wage adjustment
(columns 5 and 6). We begin with the wage equation. WNC t reﬂects strongly
the current and previous-contract inﬂationary environment, captured by the
coeﬃcients α and β. The estimate of α is 0.931 and it is signiﬁcantly diﬀer-
ent from both zero and unity. Compensation against inﬂation is, however,
21See also Maddala (1988, 434-441).
19spread over two consecutive contracts and the estimate of β is 0.087, a coef-
ﬁcient which is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent form zero at the 1% level. Rurate has
ac o e ﬃcient that is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level. While
these results are fully consistent with a Phillips Curve, it should be noted
that signiﬁcant Wage Curve elements are also present. The previous real
wage rate has the expected sign and is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at
the 1% level. To the extent that the variable Prodshock is correlated with
a productivity level variable such as output per capita, it, too, is consistent
with the Wage Curve speciﬁed in Blanchard and Katz (1999).
The wage control variables for the two most rigorous control programs
(the AIB and the provincial and federal programs of the 1990s) are negative
and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Most of the industry coeﬃcients
are negative except those on Natural Resources and Construction; the lowest
wage adjustments are found in Utilities and Services. The Atlantic provinces
have the highest and the Prairie provinces have the lowest wage adjustments.
The ﬁrst four columns of Table 2 deal with contract duration and index-
ation. Previous-contract values of Duration and Elasticity are included in
their respective equations. These variables help capture pair-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects which are diﬃcult or impossible to measure, e.g., risk aversion. Both
have the expected signs and are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Plemployee was
included in both equations in order to proxy worker sophistication but this
is only signiﬁcant in the indexation equation. It suggests that the elastic-
ity of indexation is higher in large bargaining units. Region and industry
ﬁxed eﬀects were included as proxies for labor demand and supply elastici-
ties in local markets and are often signiﬁcant. The longest and most highly
indexed contracts are in Manufacturing (the omitted industry), particularly
in Quebec. The regional unemployment rate suggests shorter and less in-
20dexed contracts when it is high. The positive interaction between duration
and indexation suggested by Gray (1978) and Ehrenberg, Danziger and San
(1983, 231) and others is very strongly present in the results of Table 2. This
is particularly noteworthy, given that WNCt contains the uncompensated
inﬂation mechanism which acts as a substitute for indexation.
Inspired by the theoretical literature, earlier empirical studies of contract
duration and indexation also focus on the role of nominal and real uncer-
tainty. Nominal uncertainty is expected to shorten contracts and strengthen
indexation provisions and these are the results found. Real uncertainty may
also shorten contracts and weaken indexation. Its coeﬃcient is negative and
signiﬁcant in both equations.
T h ep r e s e n c eo fWNCt in the duration equation renders Expinf insigniﬁ-
cant. The secular doubling of contract duration, evident in Figure 1, remains
tied to the inﬂationary environment. However, the inﬂuence of inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
duration equation is now mostly through its impact on WNC t, not through
Expinf directly (coeﬃcients of -0.814 and -0.109 respectively, in Table 2, col-
umn 1). This is a feature of the simultaneous model - see the stand-alone
equations in the Appendix Table A1, where WNC t has a smaller absolute
coeﬃcient than Expinf (-0.337 and -0.550 respectively, Table A1, column 1).
Thus, consideration of the duration equation in a simultaneous system strips
E x p i n fo fa n yd i r e c tr o l ei nt h a te q u a t i o n .T h eg e n e r a ld e c l i n ei nN o m u n c e r t ,
except during the early 1990s, tends to increase contract duration.
As seen in Figure 1, the elasticity of indexation tends to decline through
time but it does not have the strong and consistent secular trend that con-
tract duration does. In view of the substitutability between real expected
non-contingent wage adjustment and indexation, WNCt should enter the
indexation equation with a negative and Expinf with a positive coeﬃcient.
21This is in fact the case and, indeed, the coeﬃcients are so close in absolute
value that they suggest imposing the implied constraint. When this is done,
the coeﬃcient (coeﬀ/se) on (WNC t − Expinf) is -0.018 (-72.99). However,
this constraint cannot be accepted statistically and a small role for Expinf in
the indexation equation remains.22 The trend decline in nominal uncertainty
inﬂuences the elasticity of indexation in the right direction but this force is
interrupted by the inﬂation regime changes of the early 1990s which created
substantial inﬂation uncertainty.
In summary, the model produces theoretically coherent results. On the
outstanding empirical issue mentioned in the introduction, it suggests that
the elasticity of indexation depends negatively on the real expected non-
contingent wage adjustment, with a small role left over for expected inﬂation
itself. The duration equation aﬀords no role for expected inﬂation once non-
contingent wage adjustment is taken into account.
4.3 Total Wage Adjustment
The results in Table 2 provide a complete analysis of wage adjustment in all
contracts regardless of whether they contain indexation provisions and re-
gardless of whether these provisions change between contracts. The capacity
of the model to address all these aspects of wage adjustment is important.
Since total wage adjustment consists of the sum of WNCt and WCt = εtPt,
the predicted total wage adjustment WTt is obtained from the predicted val-
ues of WNCt, εt, and πt (in place of Pt). Details of the relationship between
actual and predicted values for WCt,WNC t and WT t are presented in Figure
4. The 9646 actual values and the predicted values are averaged by year and
22When Expinf is added to the indexation equation, along with (WNCt −Expinf),i t s
coeﬃcient (coeﬀ/se) is 0.0069 (20.47). In these analyses, other coeﬃcients are not aﬀected.
22plotted against time.23 The bottom two series, in Figure 4, present actual
and predicted WCt. Since this is determined by the product b εtπt,t h eﬁgure
is largely shaped by expected inﬂation. The height of the graph reﬂects the
small values of the elasticity of indexation. The predictions track the actual
data well, capturing the secular decreasing trend. Figure 4 provides similar
information for WNCt.T h et i m ev a r i a t i o ni nt h i sﬁgure is largely inﬂuenced
by Expinf in equation (2) which caries a near-unity coeﬃcient. The graph
is also inﬂuenced by the uncompensated inﬂation term, regional unemploy-
ment, productivity and the controls variables. The predicted values trace the
actual series well. The combined predictions for WT t appear in the top two
lines of Figure 4. Clearly, non-contingent wage adjustment has the dominant
impact on total wage adjustment.
The model provides a number of channels through which prices feed
into wages, i.e. intra-contract contingent adjustment, intra-contract non-
contingent adjustment which depends on the coeﬃcient α and expected in-
ﬂation, and inter-contract compensation for uncompensated past inﬂation
which depends on the coeﬃcient β. A fully anticipated, constant, rate of in-
ﬂation would elicit a non-contingent wage adjustment equal to α+β −αβ =
0.937. This, along with the average contingent adjustment (the average value
from Table 1, of ε =0 .075) produces a full pass-through to wages.
It should be noted that this pass-through stretches over two contracts
and may be modiﬁed in an uncertain environment. When the wage equation
allows for Nomuncert to inﬂuence the estimated values of α and β, we ﬁnd
that α decreases and β increases with inﬂation uncertainty.24 Thus, in a more
23The time variation in these ﬁgures is produced by all RHS variables, including the
pattern of settlements by industry and region which may not be constant over time. The
statements that follow presume an otherwise neutral pattern of industry and region eﬀects.
24Writing out α and β as α0 + α1Nomuncert and β0 + β1Nomuncert,w eo b t a i n
23uncertain environment, not only will the elasticity of indexation increase but
agents will tend to decrease intra-contract and increase inter-contract non-
contingent wage adjustment. Thus, the ex ante non-contingent compensation
against inﬂation will be reduced in favour of contingent payments which do
not occur until inﬂation has materialised and ex post coverage of uncompen-
sated inﬂation which does not occur until the next contract. The response
to inﬂation shocks is, therefore, stretched out.
4.4 Simulating the Impact of Disinﬂation
To further study the interrelationships among the three key provisions of
labor market contracts, we simulate how declining inﬂation aﬀects duration,
indexation, and non-contingent wage adjustment. Since inﬂation declined
from an average of 9.14% during the high inﬂa t i o np e r i o dt oa na v e r a g eo f
1.64% during the low inﬂation period, the linear combination of the respec-
tive averages 9.14(1−t)+1.64t, where t =0 ,0.05,0.1,...0.9,0.95,1 is used to
describe the expected inﬂation path. Equations (2), (3) and (7) are used to
solve for non-contingent wage adjustment, duration and indexation for each
inﬂation value. Since, for present purposes, only time-dependent variables
are important25, Manufacturing and Ontario (the omitted classes) are con-
sidered. The starting values of the relevant RHS variables are taken from
their means in the high inﬂation period. Then the three equations are solved
simultaneously. The estimates of Duration, Elasticity and WNCt are used
to update Pdur, Pelasticity, and Prealwage. Inﬂation information is updated
accordingly, and the system is solved again to derive a new set of Duration,
α0 =0 .89(139.08),α 1 = −0.034(−14.5), β0 =0 .125(10.78), and β1 =0 .075(2.97). The
remaining coeﬃcients in the wage equation are not aﬀfected.
25We set nominal and real uncertainties at their mean.
24Elasticity, and WNCt values.
The predictions of Duration, Elasticity and WNCt are consistent with the
raw data. As inﬂation decreases from its average in the high inﬂation period
to its average in the low inﬂation period, predicted duration increases from
20.8 to 30.8 months. The actual averages in the two subsamples were 20.9
and 29.3 respectively. Predicted elasticity decreases by 0.02, which is close
to the change of the subsample means. Similarly, predicted non-contingent
wage adjustment changes from 9.77% to 2.55% while the subsample means
changed from 10.51% in the high inﬂation period to 1.67% in the low inﬂation
period. The linear form of the simulated inﬂation function carries through
to Lt,ε t and WNCt but, since εt is a Tobit and WNC t is nonlinear, their
predictions contain non-linearities. A graph is available on request.
4.5 Sensitivity Analysis
We have checked a number of the exclusion restrictions in Table 2 in order to
see if our main results are aﬀected. First, we added the previous real wage
in the duration and indexation equations on the grounds that, in the risk-
sharing paradigm, this may proxy risk aversion and enter all equations. This
variable was not signiﬁcant in either case and our results were unchanged.
Controls have been thought to inﬂuence contract provisions other than
the one toward which they were explicitly directed (i.e. wage adjustment).
When all three control variables are included in all equations they are insignif-
icant with two exceptions. The variables 9pubcontrol and 7control have a
coeﬃcient of -2.128 (-3.45) in the duration equation and 0.033 (3.01) in the
indexation equation respectively. The remaining results are not aﬀected.
The inclusion of Prodshock in the duration and indexation equations
produced a small, signiﬁcant, coeﬃcient in the duration equation of -0.034
25(-2.17) and an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient in the elasticity equation.
If the professionalism and sophistication that may come with a larger
bargaining unit increases interest in indexation, as our results suggest, this
may also inﬂuence the wage bargain. Including Plemployee in the wage
equation as well produced an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient and left our results
unchanged.
Adding the uncertainty variables in the wage equation resulted in coeﬃ-
cients which were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in either equation.
The selective inclusion of variables in the few instances where signiﬁcance
was achieved was of no real consequence for the arguments presented here.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we consider the determinants of key provisions of wage con-
tracts such as their duration, their degree of indexation and hence contingent
wage adjustment, and their non-contingent and total wage adjustment. We
examine a period (1976-2000) long enough to encompass periods of high
and low inﬂation and transitions between inﬂation regimes that are associ-
ated with heightened nominal and real uncertainty. A large number (9646)
of contracts are investigated. A particular concern is the theoretically unex-
pected presence of expected inﬂation in the contract duration and indexation
equations found in many earlier studies. Our more complete model has impli-
cations for this conundrum because it justiﬁes the inclusion of non-contingent
wage adjustment and the expected rate of inﬂa t i o ni nt h ed u r a t i o na n di n -
dexation equations. Using general-to-particular methods, it is then possible
to comment on the role of these variables.
The inﬂation variables, constructed in an internally consistent manner
26from recursive GARCH procedures, have a critical role to play in this model.
Expected inﬂation continues to have a negative coeﬃcient but it is not signif-
icant in the duration equation. The correctly predicted doubling of contract
duration comes from the endogenously declining non-contingent wage adjust-
ment. In the elasticity equation, real expected non-contingent wage change
has a major role to play, though a small (relative to earlier studies) role
r e m a i n sf o rt h ee x p e c t e dr a t eo fi n ﬂation. Inﬂation uncertainty aﬀects con-
tract duration negatively and indexation positively. Real uncertainty reduces
both duration and indexation. Contract duration and indexation are sub-
stantially interrelated, with more heavily indexed contracts being long and
long contracts more likely to be strongly indexed.
It would be surprising if, in light of earlier work based on both micro
and aggregate data, unemployment did not inﬂuence non-contingent wage
adjustment. Yet, elements found in Wage Curve speciﬁcations and in the
Blanchard and Katz (1999) nesting equation are also present. In particular,
the previous-contract real wage has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient in the wage equation. The deviation of the natural logarithm of
real GDP from a linear trend, which proxies productivity shocks, has a posi-
tive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in the wage equation. This equation describes
non-contingent wage adjustment well, taking into account current and past
indexation provisions, expected inﬂation, and uncompensated inﬂation left
over from the previous contract. This latter ﬁnding provides a propagation
mechanism for inﬂation shocks that entails long lags, given that the average
contract duration is over two years. Some evidence was provided that greater
inﬂation uncertainty would reduce the amount of expected inﬂation built into
the current non-contingent adjustment, shifting inﬂa t i o np a s s - t h r o u g hi n t o
the future through the uncompensated inﬂation mechanism. Thus, the prop-
27agation mechanism becomes longer during more uncertain inﬂation times.
Our results are more consistent with the theoretical ideas referred to in
footnote 1 than those of earlier empirical studies, where all three variables and
their interactions were not modelled as a system. While we build on received
theory, our study oﬀers some inductive messages to the deduction/induction
cycle. To begin with, more complete mechanisms linking contingent and non-
contingent wage adjustment, particularly as the latter may emanate from
uncompensated past-contract experience, are needed. Hints that the elas-
ticity of indexation may, under certain circumstances, depend on expected
inﬂation appear in Ehrenberg, Danziger and San (1983, 224) and this possi-
bility needs to be explored further. Finally, the fact that inﬂation appears
to feed into wage adjustment in a complex manner, which is itself inﬂuenced
by the inﬂation environment, should be of interest to macroeconomists and
students of propagation mechanisms generally.
Of course, our inductive messages need to be checked in a number of
ways. The recursive GARCH process generating the all-important inﬂation
variables could, in the context of countries where such information is avail-
able, be replaced by good survey data. Data from other countries might also
be useful if their inﬂation and contractual provisions diﬀer.
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346 Data Appendix
The following variables were drawn from the HRDC database:
Duration: Diﬀerence between expiry and eﬀective date (rounded to the
nearest whole month).
Cola: A dummy variable which equals 1 if the contract contains any one
of four COLA clause types.
Elasticity: The percentage change of COLA wage adjustment divided by
the percentage change in the CPI, over the duration of the contract - at
annual rates.
WNC t: Non-COLA wage change as a percentage - at annual rates.
WC t: COLA wage change as a percentage - at annual rates.
WT t: Total wage change as a percentage - at annual rates.
Pelasticity: Elasticity for the previous contract.
Prealwage: The nominal wage rate divided by the CPI at the end of
previous agreement.
Industry: Dummy variables generated using the Statistics Canada 1970
Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation code - Manufacturing is the omitted class.
Region: Atlantic refers to Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova
Scotia and New Brunswick; Prairies refers to Manitoba, Saskatchewan and
Alberta: Territories refers to Yukon and North West Territories. Ontario is
the omitted class.
Plemployee: The natural logarithm of the number of employees in the
previous contract.
The following variables are generated from the GARCH processes:
Expinf: Expected inﬂation generated, from a recursive GARCH (1,1)
process describing the inﬂation rate. It is the average inﬂation rate forecast
one quarter ahead and at the end of the current contract. It is assigned
35a c c o r d i n gt ot h ee ﬀective date of the contract. Based on the All Items
Consumer Price Index (Statistics Canada P100000 and CANSIM II Series
v735739 with 1992=100).
Nomuncert: Inﬂation uncertainty generated as the one quarter ahead
forecast of the conditional variance from a recursive GARCH (1,1) process
describing the inﬂation rate. Assigned according to the eﬀective date.
Realuncert: Real uncertainty generated as the one quarter ahead forecast
of the conditional variance from a recursive GARCH (1,1) process describing
the growth rate of real GDP (Statistics Canada D15721, with 1992=100).
Assigned according to the eﬀective date.
Additional variables that were appended
Rurate: The regional, quarterly, unemployment rate matched by province
at settlement date - source Statistics Canada.
Prodshock: Productivity shock measured as the deviation of ln real GDP
from a linear trend (Statistics Canada D15721).
7control: Dummy variables that equals unity if the eﬀective date of the
contract was in 1978 quarter 1 or 2 or earlier; otherwise equal to zero.
8provcontrol: Dummy variable that equals unity if a relevant provincial
contract started during 1982; otherwise equal to zero.
9pubcontrol: Dummy variable that equals unity if a contract fell under
federal or provincial controls during the early 1990s - see Swimmer (2000);
otherwise equal to zero.
36Table 1
Summary Statistics (NO. of Observations = 9646)
Variable Description Mean Std Dev
WNCt Non-COLA wage change as a percentage 4.451 4.059
WCt COLA wage change as a percentage 0.346 1.277
WNCWCt Total wage change as a percentage 4.798 4.205
Duration contract length in month 25.629 11.499
Cola  =1, if a contract contains COLA clause 0.192 0.394
Elasticity  the intensity of indextion 0.075 0.257
E| E>0 conditional elasticity 0.579 0.462
Pcola  =1, if  previous contract contains COLA clause 0.206 0.404
Pelasticity  the intensity of indextion for previous contract 0.085 0.269
Pdur contract duration for previous contract 23.892 9.906
Pnomwage nominal wage in previous contract 13.308 5.470
Prealwage real wage in previous contract 15.711 4.801
Plemployee natural logarithm of employee in previous contract 7.064 0.959
Rurate quarterly regional unemployment rate 9.361 2.762
Pgdp detrended real GDP in previous contract -4.420 18.468
Pdurneg negotiation duration in previous contract 7.716 5.632
Expinf expected inflation estimated from GARCH 4.446 3.053
Nomuncert nominal uncertainty from recursive GARCH 0.350 0.158
Realuncert real uncertainty from recursive GARCH 1.167 1.175
Natres dummy variable for natural resource 0.027 0.163
Manuf dummy variable for manufacture 0.195 0.396
Constr dummy variable for construction 0.051 0.220
Transp dummy variable for transportation 0.082 0.274
Commun dummy variable for communication 0.036 0.186
Utils dummy variable for untilty 0.028 0.165
Trade dummy variable for trade 0.042 0.200
Educat dummy variable for education 0.251 0.434
Health dummy variable for health care 0.085 0.278
Services dummy variable for service 0.032 0.176
Others dummy variable for other sector 0.171 0.377
Mari dummy variable for Maritime provinces 0.071 0.257
Que dummy variable for Qubec 0.150 0.358
Ont dummy variable for Ontario 0.365 0.481
Prarie dummy variable for Prarie provinces 0.170 0.376
BC dummy variabe for British Columbia 0.115 0.319
Terri dummy variable for territories 0.005 0.069
Mprov dummy variable for muti-provinces 0.124 0.330
7control dummy variable for wage control in the 70s 0.003 0.005
8pubcontr dummy variable for wage control in the 80s 0.004 0.065
9pubcontr dummy variable for wage control in the 90s 0.030 0.175Table 2
Estimation Results for Simultaneous Equations:
Duration, Elasticity and Non-Contingent Wage Adjustment
Variable Duration coeff/se Elasticity ceoff/se WNC coeff/se
Intercept 33.374 33.410 -0.086 -7.700 4.841 32.890
Duration 0.004 16.960
Elasticity 1.724 2.610
WNC -0.814 -7.870 -0.015 -42.830
α 0.931 143.090
β 0.087 9.100
Expinf -0.109 -0.950 0.022 78.170
Rurate -0.992 -14.570 -0.005 -11.210 -0.334 -28.220
Pdur/Pelas. 0.328 29.370 0.241 239.480
Prealwage -0.054 -8.900
Natres -0.528 -0.850 -0.006 -1.670 0.082 0.660
Constr -2.128 -3.560 -0.073 -13.510 0.401 2.950
Transp -1.297 -2.890 -0.047 -13.770 -0.328 -2.940
Commun -2.470 -4.410 -0.047 -9.160 -0.273 -2.220
Utils -3.815 -5.940 -0.050 -8.450 -0.586 -3.590
Trade -0.552 -0.980 -0.088 -18.260 -0.358 -2.990
Educat -6.828 -17.560 -0.059 -20.510 -0.416 -5.350
Health -3.894 -8.540 -0.064 -18.770 -0.099 -1.100
Services -2.048 -2.740 -0.080 -13.930 -0.687 -4.270
Others -4.775 -11.380 -0.070 -20.380 -0.377 -4.230
Atlantic 9.221 17.390 -0.005 -1.170 1.427 12.440
Quebec 6.400 17.030 0.022 7.180 0.861 10.040
Prairie 0.121 0.360 -0.019 -7.160 -0.733 -10.960
BC 4.182 11.440 -0.023 -8.180 0.456 6.210
Terri 2.501 1.340 0.014 1.010 0.325 0.850
Mprov 2.025 4.700 -0.021 -6.510 0.181 1.840
Plemployee -0.035 -0.310 0.007 9.520
Nomuncert -1.690 -2.440 0.010 1.970




9pubcontrol -0.812 -4.46Figure 1
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Single Equation Estimates for Duration, Indexation and Nominal Wage Adjustment
Duration (OLS) Elasticity (Tobit) WNC (Nonlinear OLS)
Variable coefficient coeff/se coefficient coeff/se coefficient coeff/se
Intercept 31.494 30.700 -1.376 -10.220 4.996 35.340
Duration 0.015 12.180
Elasticity 2.666 6.280
WNC -0.337 -7.610 -0.100 -16.830
α 0.899 150.250
β 0.127 14.110
Expinf -0.550 -9.210 0.142 20.120
Urate -0.815 -13.900 -0.064 -7.580 -0.337 -29.220
Pdur/Pelas 0.325 28.950 1.019 28.620
Prealwage -0.057 -9.490
Natres -0.421 -0.670 -0.027 -0.440 0.089 0.760
Constr -2.068 -4.150 -0.342 -4.800 0.419 3.200
Transp -1.144 -2.550 -0.139 -2.520 -0.320 -2.980
Commun -2.451 -4.150 -0.178 -2.320 -0.267 -2.220
Utils -3.585 -5.670 -0.215 -2.740 -0.574 -3.590
Trade -0.487 -0.910 -0.504 -6.260 -0.335 -3.040
Educat -6.643 -20.580 -0.333 -8.460 -0.390 -5.490
Health -3.954 -9.360 -0.391 -6.840 -0.092 -1.120
Services -1.904 -3.200 -0.540 -5.280 -0.678 -5.210
Other -4.651 -13.120 -0.391 -8.400 -0.328 -3.930
Atlantic 8.373 15.910 0.108 1.430 1.445 12.990
Que 6.007 16.230 0.234 4.890 0.860 10.420
Prairie 0.426 1.450 -0.094 -2.280 -0.733 -11.090
BC 3.930 11.020 -0.110 -2.100 0.474 6.670
Terri 2.488 1.760 0.168 0.960 0.337 0.960
Mprov 1.918 4.970 -0.152 -2.650 0.195 2.050
Lpemploye -0.016 -0.140 0.067 4.550
Nomuncert -1.936 -2.820 0.148 1.480
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Intercept -1.3764 -0.126 -0.0207 -0.1053 -0.2263 -0.328
Duration 0.0154 0.0014 0.0002 0.0012 0.0025 0.0037
WNC -0.0997 -0.0091 -0.0015 -0.0076 -0.0164 -0.0238
Expinf 0.1419 0.013 0.0021 0.0109 0.0233 0.0338
Rurate -0.0644 -0.0059 -0.001 -0.0049 -0.0106 -0.0153
Pelasticity 1.0191 0.0933 0.0153 0.0779 0.1675 0.2428
Natres -0.0272 -0.0025 -0.0004 -0.0021 -0.0045 -0.0065
Constr -0.3417 -0.0313 -0.0051 -0.0261 -0.0562 -0.0814
Transp -0.1392 -0.0127 -0.0021 -0.0106 -0.0229 -0.0332
Commun -0.1781 -0.0163 -0.0027 -0.0136 -0.0293 -0.0424
Utils -0.2153 -0.0197 -0.0032 -0.0165 -0.0354 -0.0513
Trade -0.5035 -0.0461 -0.0076 -0.0385 -0.0828 -0.12
Educat -0.3329 -0.0305 -0.005 -0.0255 -0.0547 -0.0793
Health -0.3912 -0.0358 -0.0059 -0.0299 -0.0643 -0.0932
Services -0.5397 -0.0494 -0.0081 -0.0413 -0.0887 -0.1286
Other -0.3905 -0.0357 -0.0059 -0.0299 -0.0642 -0.093
Atlantic 0.1084 0.0099 0.0016 0.0083 0.0178 0.0258
Que 0.2343 0.0214 0.0035 0.0179 0.0385 0.0558
Prairie -0.0935 -0.0086 -0.0014 -0.0072 -0.0154 -0.0223
BC -0.1101 -0.0101 -0.0017 -0.0084 -0.0181 -0.0262
Terri 0.1681 0.0154 0.0025 0.0129 0.0276 0.0401
Mprov -0.1524 -0.0139 -0.0023 -0.0117 -0.0251 -0.0363
Lpemploye 0.0665 0.0061 0.001 0.0051 0.0109 0.0158
Nomuncert 0.1483 0.0136 0.0022 0.0113 0.0244 0.0353






a F is the cumulative standard normal density function evaluated at 
b f is the standard normal probability density function.
c Mean of estimated unconditional elasticity; E(Elasticity*) is the mean of the conditional variable. 
b z f ) (
a z F ) (
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